Cite As: Joseph Myers, Casenote, Apple v. Microsoft: Virtual Identity in the GUI Wars, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5 (1995) <http://www.urich.edu/~jolt/v1i1/myers.html>.
{1} The company that controls the interface of the next major operating system will have the ability to set the standards for application software.[1] It was not surprising that Apple Corporation began its fight to stop Windows from being that major operating system[2] after Microsoft Corporation introduced the various versions of its Windows software[3] and announced plans for this program to replace the already widely selling DOS operating system. Unfortunately, Apple chose to conduct this war on the complex and often confusing battleground of copyright law, which ultimately proved to be its downfall.[4]
{2} The basic purpose of copyright law is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."[5] The idea is to benefit the public by encouraging individual effort through the enhancement of personal gain.[6] Typically, copyright protection is awarded to literary work, and Congress has included the code that makes up a computer program in this category.[7] Additionally, some non-literal expression is protected. For example, not only are the actual words in an author's copyrighted novel protected, but the structure and plot may be protected as well.[8] The debate[9] in the area of computer science is whether, by analogy, this means that the result, output, organization or display (the "look and feel") of a computer program might be protected as well, even if the source code is different.[10] This is to be distinguished from the idea underlying the program, which is not subject to copyright protection.[11]
{3} To establish copyright infringement, the plaintiff must prove ownership of a valid and existing copyright and copying by the defendant.[12] This copying can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.[13] Usually the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's copyrighted work and that there is a "substantial similarity" between the two works.[14] If the plaintiff is arguing for the protection of the "total concept and feel" of the product, but the discrete elements that make up the whole are not individually copyrightable or protectable, then only virtually identical copying is barred.[15]
{4} As will be shown below, Apple advocated a substantial similarity standard to protect its interface. However, because the interface was composed of elements not protected by copyright law, this position would prove to be Apple's downfall.
{6} Broken into these two branches, the standard of substantial similarity is still subject to varied interpretation and judicial discretion. As Judge Learned Hand said, "[N]o principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc."[20] Despite the ambiguous nature of this test, it is obvious that it does not require anything close to exact copying in order to find copyright infringement.
{8} What is meant by virtually identical is not entirely clear. The courts have also used the word identical alone.[24] Since the standard is most often expressed with the modifier "virtually," we can assume that the two works need not be exactly alike in every respect. Finally, for purposes of understanding this case, we must recognize that the virtual identity standard is much more stringent than the substantial similarity standard.[25]
{11} The agreement held until Microsoft released Windows version 2.03, which was described by Apple as being more "Mac-like,"[36] Apple filed this law suit against Microsoft and its sub-licensee Hewlett-Packard claiming that their products infringed on Apple's copyrights in the presentation and control of on-screen information.[37]
{12} An extensive series of motions and refilings followed. By the time the case reached the Ninth Circuit, the lower courts had found for Microsoft on the central issue of copyright infringement. The basis of this decision was that the appropriate standard to apply was virtual identity. Apple did not argue that the two works were virtually identical. Rather, they argued that the appropriate standard to protect "look and feel" works is substantial similarity.[38]
{14} At the other end of the spectrum is Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. [45] decided six years later. In this case, an employee of Computer Associates took code with him when he left to begin work at Altai.[46] After this was discovered, Altai began reprogramming the product in question using engineers completely unfamiliar with the copied code.[47] This left only the non-literal program structure to be protected.[48] The Altai court rejected the Whelan approach,[49] designing instead a three-part test. This test called for the abstraction of the various layers of program structure, filtration of unprotectable elements, and a comparison of the remaining protected elements with those of the infringing product.[50] The court held that this dissection process (popularly known as the "abstraction-filtration-comparison" test) was necessary to preserve "certain fundamentals of copyright doctrine."[51] It is this approach that Apple fought against. It is this spectrum of analysis along which the Apple court's decision must lie.
{16} In an earlier draft of the agreement, Apple attempted to limit the license to version 1.0 as a whole. Microsoft removed this provision from the agreement, and Apple agreed to the final draft which ommitted this language.[56] As a result, the parties agreed to license only the individual elements. Since the agreement contained an integration clause which precluded contradiction of its terms by collateral understandings, all further arguments concerning extrinsic evidence were ineffective.[57]
{17} For these reasons, the court held that the licensing agreement prevented Apple from maintaining a copyright infringement action for those specific elements covered by the license. Accordingly, the court identified which elements of the screen displays were licensed and which were not.[58] The court then dissected the remaining elements to determine which fit into limiting categories in order to distinguish expression from ideas.[59] The goal was to prohibit broad copyright protection for those elements which flowed naturally from basic ideas, those which were expressed in one of only a few possible ways (given the constraints of the computer environment), or those which lacked originality.
{21} The Apple court extended this doctrine to apply to any dissectable whole, rather than mere fact compilations and databases.[74] The court rejected Apple's contention that, in looking for originality, the court should look to the work as a whole.[75] Relying on Feist, the court looked only for elements of the work original to the author.[76] Considering that Apple admitted to borrowing heavily from Xerox Star and a research report from IBM Pictureworld, the court did not find the originality that Feist requires.[77]
{23} At first glance, it may appear that the court in Apple chose between two standards. The court itself refers to placing the case on the continuum that was created from the earlier decisions.[81] However, a careful reading reveals no such choice.
{24} Apple had licensed certain elements of its program to Microsoft. These elements were therefore not subject to copyright protection. For this reason it was proper, even necessary, for the court to dissect the program to determine which elements were protectable and which were not. This left the court without any real options in choosing a standard. Since the discrete elements making up the whole were not subject to protection, the whole could only be protected from virtually identical copying. To hold otherwise would extend protection beyond what copyright was designed to protect.
{25} Apple argued that the court should have compared the "look and feel" of the products before dividing the program into discrete elements.[82] If the case had proceeded more quickly, it is possible that Apple might have prevailed. However, by the time this case was decided, copyright law had evolved to work against Apple.[83] Accordingly, the court applied the correct standard - virtual identity.
{26} To put this case into perspective, it might be useful to look at the computer and software industries to understand what was truly at issue. Some authorities state that it has become clear "that some type of Windows-like desktop metaphor will dominate the present and next generation of personal computers and work stations."[84] Microsoft has taken away a large part of Apple's edge, and Apple would like it back.[85] It is important to recognize that this litigation had far-reaching affects on both companies' plans for the future.[86] The winner was destined to gain more influence in setting the standards for future developments.[87]
{27} There is also the matter of product identification. For example,
[a]n employee on the way back to his office [who] glances at the illuminated screen of a nearby computer . . . sees a small trash can in the lower right corner; graphics of labeled file folders, documents and applications in the center, and a strip of words across the top of the screen . . . [would] immediately assume that the computer is an Apple Macintosh.[88]{28} It is this kind of recognition that the developers are trying to protect. As this case demonstrated, copyright protection does not effectively achieve this goal.[89]
{29} It is not difficult or unreasonable to conclude that Microsoft borrowed ideas from Apple to design its program. The similarities are present for individual judgment. But it is not enough to show that Microsoft copied Apple. It must also be shown that Apple had a right to the exclusive use of those elements. As this case demonstrates, this is not an easy standard to meet. With the addition of the stringent virtual identity standard, it is unlikely that the courts and copyright law will provide much protection for future "look and feel" plaintiffs.
[1] Nicholas P. Terry, GUI Wars: The Windows Litigation and the Continuing Decline of "Look and Feel", 47 ARK. L. REV. 93, 107 (1994).
[2] The lawsuit was actually filed in 1988 based on Windows version 2.03 and Hewlett-Packard's New Wave. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F. Supp. 925, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1989). However, it was later amended to include the even more popular 3.x versions of Windows. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
[3] Version 3.0 was released early summer of 1990. Terry, supra note 1, at 93. Version 3.1 was released on April 6, 1992. See Lawrence J. Magid, New Version of Windows Has Subtle but Significant Improvements, THE WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 6, 1992, at F17. By 1993 sales of Windows based programs had far exceeded DOS applications. Terry, supra note 1, at 95-96. See also L.R. Shannon, Windows Widens Its Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1993, at C6.
[4] Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3518 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1995) (No. 94-1121).
[5] U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
[6] Debra A. Sitzberger, Copyright Law -- Who Gets the Picture? -- Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3982 (U.S. June 14, 1982) (No. 81-1697), 57 WASH. L. REV. 599, 600 (1982).
[7] June M. Besek, Copyright for Software and Databases: Summary of Authorities with an Emphasis on Current Judicial Developments, in UNDERSTANDING BASIC COPYRIGHT LAW 1994, 701, 701 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 391, 1994) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
[8] David W.T. Daniels, Comment, Learned Hand Never Played Nintendo: A Better Way to Think About the Non-Literal, Non-Visual Software Copyright Cases, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 613 (1994). See also Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
[9] See, e.g., I.T. Hardy, The Policy, Law, and Facts of Copyrighting Computer Screen Displays: An Essay, 11 COMPUTER/L.J. 371 (1992).
[10] See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). For example, identical display screens could be created using two different computer languages. As such, neither "author" would have used any of the same potentially copyrighted code as the other, and yet their products are indistinguishable. Id.
[11] 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); See also, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977); Peter A. Wald et al., Standards for Interoperability and the Copyright Protection of Computer Programs, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1994, at 481 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 390, 1994).
[12] Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976).
[13] Terry, supra note 1, at 110.
[14] Id.
[15] See Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1507 (9th Cir. 1987).
[16] Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id. See also International Luggage Registry v. Avery Prods. Corp., 541 F.2d 830, 831 (9th Cir. 1976).
[20] Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
[21] Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1507 (9th Cir. 1987).
[22] Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
[23] See Frybarger v. International Business Mach. Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987).
[24] E.g., Rachel, 831 F.2d at 1507 ("[S]ince the works at issue here are not identical, we agree that 'no reasonable jury could conclude that the indispensable expression of these similar ideas is virtually identical.'" ).
[25] See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft, Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3518 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1995) (No. 94-1121). In fact, the Apple Court refers to this as "'thin' protection." Id. at 1438.
[26] Terry, supra note 1, at 98.
[27] Xerox Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1542, 1543 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
[28] Terry, supra note 1, at 99.
[29] Jonathan Weber, A Little Computer With Big Impact, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1991, at D1, D2 (referring to Compaq's development and sale of the 386 chip - one of the Intel chips capable of running Windows-based machines in 1986).
[30] Microsoft Displays Window Program, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1983, at D4.
[31] Terry, supra note 1, at 100. The delay in shipping was apparently due to bugs in the final stages of development. Id.
[32] Andrew Pollack, Microsoft Tries Again to Set a Standard, N.Y. TIMES, May. 7, 1990, at D1. DOS-based systems already had the bulk of the personal computer market. Id. However, Apple had made progress when their graphical system was combined with a laser printer that could use the Adobe System PostScript printer language. They were able to set the standard for Desktop Publishing. It was this area that the new products threatened and that Apple was seeking to protect. Terry, supra note 1, at 100-01.
[33] John Markoff, Armistice for Apple and Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1992, at D1.
[34] Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1447-48 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (summarizing the agreement). See also Lawrence M. Fisher, Apple and Microsoft Disclose a 1985 Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1988, at D5.
[35] Terry, supra note 1, at 116.
[36] Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1438 (9th Cir. 1994).
[37] See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F. Supp. 925, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1989). See also Andrew Pollack, Apple sues Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1988, at D3.
[38] See generally Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 779 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3518 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1995) (No. 94-1121).
[39] See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992), rev'd, 63 U.S.L.W. 2565 (1st Cir. 1995).
[40] Terry, supra note 1, at 139. However, it is related to the more commonly known and older area of copyright law known as the "total concept and feel" approach. Id. at n. 213.
[41]797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
[42] Daniels, supra note 8, at 621. The original program was written in Event Driven Language (EDL), while the "offending" program was written in BASIC. Id.
[43] Id. at 622.
[44] Id.
[45] 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
[46] Daniels, supra note 8, at 622-23.
[47] Id. at 623.
[48] Computer Assocs. Int'l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 775 F. Supp. 544, 561-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). The district court found that the only similarities were the result of the shared functions and operating systems, and therefore were not protectable. Id.
[49] Altai, 982 F.2d at 702, 705-06.
[50] Id. at 706.
[51] Id. at 712.
[52] Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1440-42 (9th Cir. 1994).
[53] Id. at 1440 (quoting the 1985 license agreement between Apple and Microsoft).
[54] Id. (quoting the 1985 license agreement between Apple and Microsoft).
[55] Id.
[56] Id. at 1440-41.
[57] Id. at 1441.
[58] Id. at 1442-47.
[59] Id. at 1444-45.
[60] Id. at 1444. See also Gerald Sobel & David Einhorn, Software Protection and Licensing, in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 1989, at 369 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 265, 1989).
[61] See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
[62] See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 1977); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
[63] Apple, 35 F.3d at 1444.
[64] Id. at 1444-45.
[65] Frybarger v. International Business Mach. Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.) (quoting Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978))).
[66] Id.
[67] Apple, 35 F.3d at 1444.
[68] 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
[69] Id. at 347-48. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992).
[70] Feist, 499 U.S. at 343.
[71] Id. at 362.
[72] Id. at 349.
[73] Id. at 363.
[74] See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994).
[75] Id.
[76] Id. (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 348-51).
[77] Id.
[78] Id. at 1446.
[79] Id.
[80] Id. at 1447.
[81] Id.
[82] Id. at 1442.
[83] Terry, supra note 1, at 156-58. Of course, it is worth repeating that the choice of standard ended the inquiry because Apple chose to argue that the works were virtually identical, having focused instead solely on arguing which standard on apply. Arguably, Apple might have gone about this a more effective way.
[84] Id. at 103 (internal footnote omitted).
[85] Lauren F. Kellner, Comment, Trade Dress Protection for Computer User Interface "Look and Feel", 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (1994) ("Any product that is the first to incorporate an intuitive new user interface possesses a tremendous competitive advantage.")
[86] See Terry, supra note 1, at 106-07. For example, Microsoft has announced plans for more advanced versions of Windows and both companies are working on future network interfaces based on the environment. "Any legally induced pause in the development of the Windows line of OS products would seriously damage and possibly destroy Microsoft's strategy." Id.
[87] Id. at 107.
[88] Kellner, supra note 85, at 1011.
[89] The difficulties that were presented to Apple by this case makes one wonder why the attorneys for Apple chose to pursue their claim under copyright law. For an argument that Trade Dress law might have been better able to achieve Apple's goals, see generally Kellner, supra note 85.
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology // JLT@uofrlaw.urich.edu