[Page n] references relate to the pagination of the printed version.

Click here to jump to a specific page:

[Page 709]

THE METAPHOR IS THE KEY: CRYPTOGRAPHY,
THE CLIPPER CHIP, AND THE CONSTITUTION

A. Michael Froomkin*

Table of Contents

• Introduction
• I. Modern Cryptography: Private Security, Government Insecurity
  • A. Who Needs Cryptography?
    • 1. Banks, ATM-Users, Electronic Transactors
    • 2. Businesses with Commercial and Trade Secrets
    • 3. Professionals
    • 4. National ID Cards and Data Authentication
    • 5. Criminals
    • 6. Users of Telephones, Electronic Mail, Faxes, or Computers
      • a. Cellular Telephones
      • b. Standard Telephones
      • c. Faxes
      • d. E-mail
      • e. Personal Records
      [Page 710]
    • 7. Dissidents and Others
  • B. The U.S. Data Encryption Standard (DES) Is Increasingly Vulnerable
    • 1. How DES Became a Standard
    • 2. DES Is Vulnerable to Attack
    • 3. How to Achieve Better Security
  • C. The Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)
    • 1. Why the Government Wants EES to Replace DES
      • a. Domestic Law Enforcement
      • b. Intelligence-Gathering
      • c. Failure of Laws Designed to Prevent the Spread of Strong Cryptography
        • i. Export Control: The ITAR
        • ii. "Classified at Birth"
    • 2. How Clipper Works
      • a. A Tale of Three Keys
      • b. The Escrow Agents' Critical Role
      • c. Limited Recourse for Improper Key Disclosure
• II. The Escrowed Encryption Proposal--Legal, Policy and Technical Problems
  • A. EES: The Un-Rule Rule
    • 1. FIPS 185: A Strange Standard
    • 2. An End-Run Around Accountability
    • 3. Did NIST's Cooperation with the NSA over FIPS 185 Violate the Computer Security Act of 1987?
    • 4. Who Should Hold the Keys?
  • B. Unresolved Issues
    • 1. Requests From Foreign Governments
    • 2. Clipper Abroad?
    • 3. What Level of Protection Do LEAFs Have Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act?
  • C. Voluntary EES Is Constitutional
  • D. Voluntary EES Is Unlikely to Displace Un-Escrowed Cryptography
    • 1. Why EES Worries People
      • a. Preserving the Status Quo Prevents a Return to the Status Quo Ante
      • b. EES Does Not Preserve the Status Quo
      • c. The Status Quo May Not Be Stable
      [Page 711]
    • 2. Spoofing EES: The LEAF-Blower
  • E. What Happens If EES Fails?
• III. Would Mandatory Key Escrow Be Constitutional?
  • A. First Amendment Issues
    • 1. Compelled Speech
    • 2. Chilling Effect on Speech
    • 3. Anonymity and the Freedom of Association
    • 4. The Parallel to Antimask Laws
  • B. Fourth Amendment Issues
    • 1. The Fourth Amendment Does Not Give the Government an Affirmative Right to an Effective Search
    • 2. Mandatory Escrow of a Key Is a Fourth Amendment "Search or Seizure"
    • 3. Mandatory Key Escrow as a "Regulatory Search"
  • C. Fifth Amendment Issues
    • 1. The Chip Key as a Private Paper
    • 2. Is a Chip Key or a Session Key "Incriminating"?
  • D. Privacy Issues
    • 1. The Right to Autonomous Choice Regarding Nonintimate Matters
    • 2. The Right to Be Left Alone
    • 3. The Right to Autonomous Choice Regarding Intimate Matters
  • E. What Next?
• IV. Ideas Are Weapons
  • A. Caught Between Archetypes
    • 1. Big Brother
    • 2. The Conspirator
      • a. Panics Over Plotters
      • b. Modern Incarnations: The Drug Kingpin and the Terrorist
  • B. Mediating the Clash: A Metaphoric Menu
    • 1. Focus on Communication
      • a. "Car" -- How Messages Travel
      • b. "Language"
    • 2. Focus on Exclusion
      • a. "Safe"
      • b. "House"--Where Messages Come From
  • C. The Power to Choose
• Conclusion [Page 712]
• Technical Appendix: Brute-Force Cryptanalysis, Public-Key Encryption and Digital Signatures
  • A. Brute-Force Cryptanalysis
  • B. Public-Key Cryptography
  • C. Digital Signatures