Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Fall Semester, 2004

MIT 6.805 Project Topics

1. Sensors in public spaces
2. CAPPS II (airline screening) - history and policy analysis
3. MBTA Smart Card Implementation
4. National ID System
5. MIT ID card - privacy and security

Title:

	Sensors in public spaces -- Dayton, Superbowl, EZPass, UK
	(City of London, RFIDs, etc.)

Description:

	Public spaces includes highways, local roads, stadiums,
	government office buildings, convenience stores and even
	private houses are being built with more and more sensors. The
	primary purpose of these sensors vary from collecting tools,
	to police surveillance, to crime prevention, and supervision
	of child care workers. In some cases, they simply record
	images of the areas, while more sophisticated sensors attempt
	to track vehicles and even sometimes attempt to identify
	individuals through face recognition. Why are these systems
	proliferating? What sort of privacy issues do they raise? Are
	they effective at their assigned tasks? Are privacy laws up to
	dealing with the questions raised by these public sensor
	networks? Should there be a "private privacy act" to permit
	individuals to see what data is collected about them? Should
	government legislate practices for using or collecting this
	data?  Does it matter whether these sensors are publicly or
	privately owned? Do they change people's behavior in either
	positive or negative ways?

Bibliography:

	Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and
	Freedom in an Anxious Age, Random House, 2004.

	"Sensor Nation" Special Issue, IEEE Spectrum, July 2004.

	United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (tracking device
	placed in contraband chloroform, with warrantless monitoring).

	United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999) (unmanned
	cameras in national forest, warrantless electronic tracking of
	vehicle).

	Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (warrantless
	use of thermal imaging device on private house).

	John Schwartz, "This Car Can Talk. What It Says May Cause Concern,"
	N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 2003

	Jeffrey Selingo, "It's the Cars, Not the Tires, That Squeal,"
	N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 2001

	"An Act Relative to Consumer Protection and Radio Frequency
	Identification Systems," Draft Bill (Sen. Barrios),
	Massachusetts Senate

	18 U.S.C. sec. 2710 (2000) ("wrongful disclosure of video tape rental
	or sale records") (enacted in wake of Justice Thomas's
	nomination).


Title:

	CAPPS II - history and policy analysis

Description:

	For the past three years, the Department of Homeland Security
	(DHS) has been planning to launch a new airline passenger
	screening system. In July 2004, DHS announced that it was
	canceling the planned deployment for this year and going back
	to the drawing board. Why did this happen? Did political
	pressure from privacy advocates kill this project? Will it
	come back in another form? What should DHS do in this area?
	Are there better technical or policy options that DHS should
	consider?

Bibliography:
	
	CAPPS II Privacy Act notices: 68 Fed. Reg. 2101 (Jan. 15, 2003)
	(original), 68 Fed. Reg. 45,265 (Aug. 1, 2003) (revised).

	EFF Web page on CAPPS II: http://www.eff.org/Privacy/cappsii/

	GAO report: "AVIATION SECURITY: Computer-Assisted Passenger
	Prescreening System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges,"
	GAO-04-385 (Feb. 12, 2004).

	The 9/11 Commission Report, http://www.9-11commission.gov/

	Samidh Chakrabarti and Aaron Strauss, "Carnival Booth: An
	Algorithm for Defeating the Computer-Assisted Passenger
	Screening System," (May 16, 2002) (6.805 student paper)

	Brian Loux, "Paper Shows Airline Profiling Ineffective,"
	The Tech, Oct. 18, 2002

	EPIC FOIA documents on "No-Fly" watchlist,
	http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/foia/watchlist_foia_analysis.html

	Alan Gathright, "No-fly list ensnares innocent travelers,"
	S.F. Chronicle, June 8, 2003

Title:

	MBTA Smart Card Implementation

Description:

	In February 2003, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation
	Authority awarded a contract to Scheidt & Bachmann of Germany
	to replace the T's automated fare collection system. In the
	summer of 2004, MBTA staff met with the staff of State
	Sen. Jarrett T. Barrios. The system as designed will include
	contactless smart cards (similar to MIT's proximity cards)
	that store money and are linked to individual identities. The
	MBTA also plans to license use of the system and the smart
	cards to other businesses and libraries for their own
	identification and purchasing purposes. The MBTA staff
	explained that when a rider loses a smart card, they need to
	be able to give them a replacement smart card with the correct
	amount of money on it. Therefore, the MBTA needs to track and
	save all transactions with the smart card. The system as
	designed appears to keep these records indefinitely.

	Sen. Barrios's staff is unsatisfied with the level of privacy
	in the current design and believe that it is possible to
	improve the system. They are also worried about the prospect
	that unauthorized individuals may be able to read others'
	smart cards remotely and even modify the amount of money, or
	the identity, on them without needing physical possession of
	the card.

	Meet with Sen. Barrios's staff in early September and discuss
	their desires and requirements. Understand the MBTA design as
	much as possible.  Then, come up with a technical discussion
	and analysis, with recommendations for improvement and
	analysis of weaknesses. You may be able to meet with the MBTA
	staff in October or November.

Bibliography:

	"Issue/Project Briefing: Automated Fare Collection (AFC) -
	Implementing Smart Cards," MBTA document, Summer 2004

	MIFARE Contactless smart cards,
http://www.semiconductors.philips.com/markets/identification/products/mifare/

	Scheidt & Bachmann Web pages:
	http://www.scheidt-bachmann.de/system/prod3/prod3a-e.htm
	http://www.scheidt-bachmann.de/index-e.html


Title:

	National ID System

Description:

	Design a nationwide "smart card" system to support identity and
	electronic financial transactions.

	Establish design goals for the system. What should the system
	do?  What advantages would it yield over today's world? Should
	financial transactions be completely untraceable? Should they
	be tracable by authorized law enforcement agencies? Who should
	be able to verify your identity, and when? Can this system be
	used for elections and voting? Justify your goals as
	appropriate in today's world. Are the "National ID" opponents'
	fears justified?

	Design and describe a technical system to meet your design goals. Who
	can do what? How are the rules enforced? What safeguards are in place?

	Analyze your system. What can go wrong? What are the pros and cons of
	the design you chose? What are the pros and cons of the goals you
	established?

Bibliography:

	Alan M. Dershowitz, "Thinking About National ID Cards,"
	Journal of Homeland Security, May 2002
	(http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/dershowitz2.htm)

	Rick Stengel, "The Case for a National ID Card,"
	Time Magazine, Oct, 17, 2001

	EPIC information on National ID cards:
	http://www.epic.org/privacy/id_cards/

	EFF page on "National Identification Systems":
	http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/nationalidsystem.html

	David Chaum, "Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments,"
	Crypto 1982

	Dennis Kugler, "Auditable Tracing with Unconditional Anonymity,"
	WISA 2001

	eCash papers:
	http://www.tcs.hut.fi/~helger/crypto/link/protocols/ecash.html


Title:

	MIT ID card - privacy and security

Description:

	MIT students have been issued "MIT ID" cards with magnetic
	stripes for ten years. But the privacy and security issues
	have never quite been resolved. What data should be collected,
	who should be able to access it, and how long should it be
	saved? What happened to the MIT Card Steering Committee and
	the MIT Privacy Committee, and should they be reconstituted?
	When data collection policies are changed, who should have a
	stake in the decision, and who should be informed of changes?
	What kind of privacy policy do the dormitories want, do
	laboratories want, and do the MIT police want? MIT continues
	to upgrade the system, e.g., adding radio "proximity" cards
	last year. What improvements should MIT seek to make in the
	future?

	Work with disparate groups on campus (MIT Card Office,
	TechCASH, MIT Police, privacy advocates, lab directors, MIT's
	technical contractors) to formulate a report, including
	recommended policies and the areas of privacy and security.
	When MIT deploys the "next" ID system, what should it be?

Bibliography:

	Andre DeHon's Web page on the MIT card, circa 1995:

	      http://www.ai.mit.edu/people/andre/mit_card/
	     
	CSAIL Prox Card Privacy Committee: http://proxcard.csail.mit.edu/

	Vulnerabilities in the MIT Prox Card:

	  http://web.mit.edu/keithw/Public/MIT-Card-Vulnerabilities-March31.pdf

	6.033 Spring 2000 assignment: "A 'Smart' and Secure MIT Card":

	  http://web.mit.edu/6.033/2000/www/handouts/h25-dp2.html

	6.033 paper on "A 'Smart' and Secure MIT Card":

	  http://web.mit.edu/6.033/2000/www/reports/dp2-thies