Circular Security

Circular Security


The classical security definition of semantic secure public-key encryption requires that an efficient attacker with access to the public encryption-key must not be able to find two messages such that it can distinguish a random encryption of one from a random encryption of the other. This notion of security, however (as well as other commonly accepted ones), does not capture certain situations that may occur in the "real world" such as encrypting and sending functions of the secret decryption-key. In recent years, extensive research effort has been invested in providing encryption schemes which are provably secure even in the above settings. Such schemes are said to achieve key-dependent message (KDM) security.

ARTICLES IN REFEREED CONFERENCES AND JOURNALS

Brakerski, Z., Goldwasser, S., and Tauman Kalai, Y. “Black-Box Circular-Secure Encryption Beyond Affine Functions.” Theory of Cryptography (TCC 2011), volume 6597 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 201-218, Providence, RI, 2011. Springer.

Brakerski, Z. and Goldwasser, S. “Circular and Leakage Resilient Public-Key Encryption under Subgroup Indistinguishability - (or: Quadratic Residuosity Strikes Back)”. In Tal Rabin, editor, Advances in Cryptology, 30th Annual Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO 2010), volume 6223 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 1-20, 2010. Springer.

TECHNICAL REPORTS

Brakerski, Z. and Goldwasser, S. “Circular and Leakage Resilient Public-Key Encryption Under Subgroup Indistinguishability (or: Quadratic Residuosity Strikes Back).” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2010: 226, 2010.

Brakerski, Z., Goldwasser, S., and Tauman Kalai, Y. “Black-Box Circular-Secure Encryption Beyond Affine Functions.” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2009: 485, 2009.