

Resistance and flexibility to compromise over sacred values

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Findings

1. Resistance to measuring SV's along an instrumental scale
 - The more salient such attempts, the greater the moral outrage and support for violent opposition
 - Thus better deals can have worse results
 - Contrast between strong preferences and SVs
2. SVs do not have infinite value
 - Amenable to trade-offs with other SVs

Finding 1: resistance to trade-offs over SVs

- Sample: 720 Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza.
- Recruited across 14 campuses
- Individual interviews
- Half members of Hamas or PIJ
- Two experiments compared reactions of *moral absolutists* versus *non absolutists*

Measuring SVs

“Do you agree that there are some extreme circumstances where it would be permissible for the Palestinian people to compromise over _____”

Yes

Don't Know/Unsure


No

- *“No” indicates SV, issue/resource more than a preference*
- *Asked about right of return and Jerusalem*


Experiment 1

- **Taboo deal:** “Suppose the United Nations organized a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians. Under this treaty **Palestinians would recognize the sacred and historic right of the Jewish people to Israel.** There would be two states - a Jewish state of Israel and a Palestinian state in 99% of the West Bank and Gaza.”
- **Taboo+:** “On their part, Israel will pay Palestine 1 billion dollars a year for 10 years.’

Violence




Anger & Disgust




Experiment 2

- **Taboo:** Suppose the United Nations has proposed a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians. This would be a two state solution, resulting in a Jewish State of Israel and a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza. Under this deal Palestinians would agree to give up their sovereignty over East Jerusalem.
- **Taboo+:** On their part, Israel will pay each Palestinian family one thousand US dollars a year for 10 years in economic assistance.

Violence



Anger & Disgust



Replicable finding

- Other samples: Jewish settlers, Palestinian refugees
- Other topics: right of return (refugees), giving up land (settlers)
- Other material incentives: more money, life free of violence

Finding 2: flexibility over SVs

- Two experiments testing hypothesis that moral absolutists should show greater flexibility over SVs if adversary makes symbolic compromises over their own SVs
- Appearance that one SV is being traded off for another rather than for material benefit

Experiment 1: Israeli Settlers


- Surveyed rep sample of settlers in August '05, days before Gaza disengagement
- Approx 50% of those surveyed were *moral absolutists* regarding the “Land of Israel” to be a SV

Anger & Disgust: Settlers

Taboo: “Israel would give up 99% of Judea and Samaria.

Israel will not absorb ANY refugees. There would be two states - a Jewish state of Israel and a Palestinian state.”


+ Symbolic: “On their part, Palestinians will give up any claims to the “right of return” - which is sacred to them”



Violence: Settlers

Taboo: “Israel would give up 99% of Judea and Samaria. Israel will not absorb ANY refugees. There would be two states - a Jewish state of Israel and a Palestinian state.”

+ Symbolic: “On their part, Palestinians will give up any claims to the “right of return” - which is sacred to them”




Experiment 2: Palestinian Refugees

- Surveyed rep sample of refugees in Dec '05, weeks before Palestinian elections
- Over 80% of those surveyed were *moral absolutists* regarding the “right of return” to be a SV

Violence: Refugees

Taboo: Palestinians would be required to give up the right to return to their homes in what is now Israel. There would be two states: a Jewish state in Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.”


+ **Symbolic:** “On their part, Israel will give up what it believes is its sacred right to the West Bank.”



“Joy” at suicide bomb: Refugees

Taboo: Palestinians would be required to give up the right to return to their homes in what is now Israel. There would be two states: a Jewish state in Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.”

+ Symbolic: “On their part, Israel will give up what it believes is its sacred right to the West Bank.”



Implications

- Experiments have demonstrated resistance and flexibility to compromise in disputes over SVs
- Unlike strong preferences, SVs are resistant to material compensation
 - More salient, worse results
- Like strong preferences, SVs show some flexibility to symbolic compensation

Next

- What happens when materially better deals are presented consecutively?
 - Material improvement transparent
- Adversarial predictions
- Moralization process